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Connecting the Dots: FinCEN’s Cross-Border Funds Transfer Alert and Its Implications for Money Services Businesses

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Connecting the Dots: FinCEN’s Cross-Border Funds Transfer Alert and Its Implications for Money Services Businesses

Executive Summary 

On November 28, 2025, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an  alert titled “FinCEN Alert on Cross-Border Funds Transfers Involving Illegal Aliens” (FIN 2025-Alert003). The alert urges Money Services Businesses (MSBs) to be “vigilant in  detecting, identifying, and reporting suspicious activity connected to cross-border funds  transfers involving illegal aliens,” defined as individuals without lawful immigration status  in the United States. 

While the MSB industry broadly supports FinCEN’s mission to protect the integrity of the  U.S. financial system and combat criminal abuse, the alert raises substantial legal and  operational concerns. Most notably, it introduces ambiguity regarding SAR reporting  expectations, appears to rely on unsupported legal premises, and risks creating de facto  regulatory obligations that are neither grounded in statute nor operationally feasible for  MSBs to implement. 

This paper examines the alert’s stated rationales, evaluates its legal underpinnings, and  explains why—absent further clarification—it leaves MSBs uncertain as to what concrete  compliance actions, if any, are required. 

Overview of the FinCEN Alert 

The alert instructs MSBs to reference FIN-2025-Alert003 in Suspicious Activity Reports  (SARs) related to cross-border funds transfers involving undocumented individuals. FinCEN  identifies three principal rationales for heightened vigilance: 

  1. Preventing exploitation of the U.S. financial system by undocumented individuals  seeking to move illicitly obtained funds, including across borders; 

  2. Advancing the intent of Executive Order 14159, Protecting the American People  Against Invasion, which asserts that undocumented individuals pose significant  threats to national security and public safety; and 

  3. Disrupting cross-border human smuggling and tra/icking networks. 

Notably, the alert does not introduce new typologies, articulate specific red flags, or  explain how existing Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) obligations should be modified or expanded to  address the perceived risks.

Existing MSB Obligations Already Address Human Smuggling Risks 

With respect to the third stated objective—combating human smuggling and tra/icking— the alert does not meaningfully expand existing regulatory expectations. 

MSBs are already required to identify and report transactions involving known or suspected  human smuggling and tra/icking activity, including remittances that appear to constitute  payments to smugglers or “coyotes.” Such activity is routinely detected and reported under  existing anti-money laundering (AML) programs. In practice, this risk is already addressed  within the current BSA framework, rendering this aspect of the alert largely duplicative. 

National Security Assertions Provide No Actionable Guidance for MSBs 

The alert’s second rationale relies on a generalized assertion that undocumented  individuals present heightened national security and public safety risks. However, MSBs  are neither positioned nor authorized to validate or operationalize this assertion. 

Routine remittance transactions—often conducted for ordinary and lawful purposes such  as family support—provide no reliable basis for assessing national security risk. The alert  does not identify transaction characteristics, behavioral indicators, or contextual factors  that would enable MSBs to translate this policy concern into actionable compliance  measures. As a result, this rationale o/ers little practical guidance to regulated entities. 

The Central Legal Issue: Earnings by Undocumented Individuals Are Not Per Se Illegal 

The most consequential implication of the alert appears to arise from its first stated  rationale: the suggestion that funds transferred by undocumented individuals are  presumptively illicit and therefore inherently suspicious. This assumption is not supported  by existing law. 

Under the BSA and federal AML statutes, SAR obligations relating to illegal activity are  grounded in the concept of Specified Unlawful Activity (SUA). SUAs are predicate o/enses  enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Proceeds derived from these  o/enses give rise to money laundering concerns. 

Although the U.S. Code identifies more than 200 SUAs, working in the United States  without lawful immigration status is not among them. Unlawful presence is generally a civil  immigration violation, not a criminal o/ense, and civil violations cannot constitute SUAs. 

Certain immigration-related crimes do qualify as SUAs, including: 

  • 8 U.S.C. § 1324 – Alien smuggling;

  • 8 U.S.C. § 1325 – Improper entry (a misdemeanor limited to the act of entry, not  overstays); 

  • 8 U.S.C. § 1324c – Document fraud; and 

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1546 – Visa and immigration fraud. 

Critically, mere unlawful presence or visa overstay does not implicate any of these  statutes. 

Taken to its logical conclusion, the premise underlying the alert would imply that any  financial transaction conducted by an undocumented individual is inherently suspicious  because the funds are presumed illicit. That conclusion finds no support in statute,  regulation, or long-standing AML practice. 

Financial Institutions Are Neither Required Nor Equipped to Verify Immigration Status 

Even apart from the absence of legal support, the alert fails to grapple with a fundamental  operational reality: U.S. financial institutions are not required to verify a customer’s  immigration status. 

MSBs, like banks and other financial institutions, routinely provide services to non-citizens  and non-residents, including foreign individuals and entities with no U.S. immigration  status at all. The AML framework has never required financial institutions to act as  immigration enforcement agents. 

Absent a legal mandate—or even a permissible mechanism—to determine lawful  presence, MSBs cannot reasonably be expected to identify transactions “involving illegal  aliens” as a distinct or reliable reporting category. 

SAR Obligations Under Existing Law 

Under current regulations, financial institutions must file a SAR when they know, suspect,  or have reason to suspect that a transaction or pattern of activity: 

  • Involves funds derived from illegal activity, including SUAs; 

  • Is intended to conceal or disguise such funds (e.g., layering, use of fictitious  names); or 

  • Lacks an apparent lawful purpose or is inconsistent with the customer’s known or  expected activity. 

None of these triggers is satisfied solely by a customer’s immigration status.

Practical Implications for MSBs: An Unresolved Quandary

The alert places U.S. money transmitters in a di/icult position. While it cannot be ignored,  it also fails to articulate clear expectations. At a minimum, MSBs must grapple with the  following unresolved questions: 

  1. What is the practical compliance consequence of the alert beyond existing SAR  obligations? 

  2. Does the alert require amendments to AML policies and procedures? 

  3. How should MSBs—and their agents—respond when they know, suspect, or have  reason to suspect that customers, including long-standing customers, lack lawful  immigration status? 

  4. What external risks should be considered, including potential civil liability or class  action exposure if customers are targeted absent a clear regulatory mandate? 

These questions are neither theoretical nor remote. The alert purports to have immediate  e/ect, yet o/ers no concrete framework for implementation. The answers must be derived  now, in the absence of clear guidance. 

Conclusion 

The FinCEN alert articulates policy objectives that the MSB industry broadly supports:  safeguarding the financial system, combating criminal abuse, and disrupting human  smuggling networks. However, it does not clearly explain how those objectives translate into new or modified compliance obligations. 

In particular, the alert: 

  • Relies on legal assumptions inconsistent with the statutory definition of Specified  Unlawful Activity; 

  • Implies SAR expectations that extend beyond existing law; 

  • Fails to acknowledge that unlawful presence is a civil matter, not a criminal  predicate o/ense; and 

  • Overlooks the fact that financial institutions are neither required nor able to verify  customers’ immigration status. 

Absent further clarification, the alert risks fostering uncertainty, inconsistent SAR filings,  and regulatory overreach in an industry that is already subject to extensive regulation.  Clear, legally grounded guidance from FinCEN is essential if MSBs are to respond in a  manner that is both compliant and operationally sound.

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